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ABSTRACT 
Satellite communications are critical to Marine Corps command and control.  Capabilities 
in the domain of beyond line of sight systems, such as wideband SATCOM, must 
periodically be assessed for alignment with relevant strategy, policy, and doctrinal 
publications.  The National Security Strategy and other documents are periodically 
updated to provide direction to the U.S. Armed Forces.  This thesis provides an analysis 
of a broad range of publications that extend from national level strategy documents down 
to service level doctrinal publications that specifically address how the Marine Corps 
conducts military operations.  The focus is to identify how beyond LOS SATCOM 
systems can support the key tenets of the NSS and USMC doctrine.  The analysis forms 
the basis for an assessment of current USMC SATCOM systems and capabilities, 
followed by considerations for future USMC SATCOM systems and capabilities.  
SATCOM provides capacity, range, and coverage that allow expeditionary forces such as 
the Marine Corps to operate anywhere, anytime.  Beyond LOS capabilities allow us to 
mass effects from fewer, more widely dispersed forces.  This thesis provides an analytical 
foundation to help shape future USMC SATCOM operational concepts.  It may then help 
shape USMC SATCOM requirements that must be satisfied by new systems. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................3 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.............................................................................3 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY .........................................................................3 
E. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................4 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION............................................................................4 
II. ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND CONCEPTS...................................5 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5 
B. ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DOCUMENTS ...............................................5 
1. National Security Strategy ..................................................................5 
2. National Space Policy of the United States of America ....................7 
3. National Defense Strategy .................................................................10 
4. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America ..14 
C. ANALYSIS OF SERVICE DOCUMENTS.................................................17 
1. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower ......................17 
2. Marine Corps Operating Concepts ..................................................18 
D. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................19 
III. ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES .............................................................................21 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................21 
B. USMC MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF) ...................25 
C. MAGTF COMMUNICATIONS...................................................................26 
D. CURRENT CAPABILITIES ........................................................................28 
1. Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver 
(DAGR) ...............................................................................................29 
2. Global Broadcast Service (GBS) Transportable Ground 
Receive Suite (TGRS) ........................................................................31 
3. Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) Satellite Communications 
System .................................................................................................32 
4. Lightweight Multi-Band Satellite Terminal (LMST) .....................34 
5. Phoenix Tactical SHF Satellite Terminal (TSST) ...........................36 
6. Tropospheric Scatter Microwave Radio Terminal.........................37 
7. Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-
T) and Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Planning 
Tool......................................................................................................38 
8. Support Wide Area Network (SWAN) ............................................40 
9. Tropo/Satellite Support Radio (TSSR) ............................................42 
E. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................43 
IV. FUTURE CAPABILITY CONSIDERATIONS......................................................45 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................45 
B. FUTURE CAPABILITY CONSIDERATIONS..........................................46 
 viii
C. INTEROPERABILITY.................................................................................48 
D. BEST PRACTICES .......................................................................................49 
1. Practices Required by the National Space Policy ...........................50 
2. Capability Portfolio Management ....................................................50 
3. Continuous Process Improvement....................................................51 
4. Product Lines .....................................................................................52 
E. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................53 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK...............................................................55 
A. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................55 
B. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY......................................56 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................59 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................63 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Military and Commercial Satellite Systems (From JP 3-14, 2009) .................23 
Figure 2. Satellite Communications Systems (From JP 6-0, 2010) ................................24 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. DAGR Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) ................................................................................................................30 
Table 2. GBS Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) ................................................................................................................31 
Table 3. GMF Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) ................................................................................................................33 
Table 4. LMST Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) ................................................................................................................35 
Table 5. TSST Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) ................................................................................................................36 
Table 6. TRC-170 Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) ................................................................................................................37 
Table 7. SMART-T Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & 
Equipment, 2009).............................................................................................39 
Table 8. SWAN Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) ................................................................................................................41 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACE................................................................................................aviation combat element 
AEHF........................................................................Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
BN............................................................................................................................battalion 
C2........................................................................................................command and control 
CBA........................................................................................capabilities-based assessment 
CDD.................................................................................capability development document 
CE.............................................................................................................command element 
CJCS...........................................................................Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CLB...............................................................................................combat logistics battalion 
CLR..............................................................................................combat logistics regiment 
CMC................................................................................Commandant of the Marine Corps 
CNO.............................................................................................Chief of Naval Operations 
COMDT COGARD............................................Commandant, United States Coast Guard 
COMMSATCOM......................................................commercial satellite communications 
CONOPS.............................................................................................concept of operations 
COTS.............................................................................................commercial off-the-shelf 
CPD.....................................................................................capability production document 
CPI...................................................................................Continuous Process Improvement 
DAGR................................Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver 
DCR............................................................................DOTMLPF change recommendation 
DDS.....................................................................................................data distribution suite 
DoD..................................................................................................Department of Defense 
DON................................................................................................Department of the Navy 
DOTMLPF...................................doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 
                                                      education, personnel, and facilities 
DSCS.................................................................Defense Satellite Communications System 
DTG............................................................digital trunk group (digital transmission group) 
ECCS...................................................................expeditionary command and control suite 
EHF...............................................................................................extremely high frequency 
ETSSP............................................................Enhanced Tactical Satellite Signal Processor 
FLTSAT............................................................................................................fleet satellite 
GBS...............................................................................................Global Broadcast Service 
GCE..................................................................................................ground combat element 
GFE...................................................................................government-furnished equipment 
GIG.................................................................................................Global Information Grid 
GMF......................................................................................................ground mobile force 
GPS.............................................................................................Global Positioning System 
ICD...........................................................................................initial capabilities document 
JCIDS............................................Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
JFC.....................................................................................................joint force commander 
JWICS............................................Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
Ka.............................................................................................................Kurtz-above Band 
 xiv
KPP............................................................................................key performance parameter 
KSA.......................................................................................................key system attribute 
Ku..............................................................................................................Kurtz-under Band 
LCE................................................................................................logistics combat element 
LMST..................................................................Lightweight Multiband Satellite Terminal 
LOS.....................................................................................................................line of sight 
LSS...............................................................................................................Lean Six Sigma 
MAGTF...................................................................................Marine air-ground task force 
MACS.......................................................................................Marine air control squadron 
MARCORSYSCOM........................................................Marine Corps Systems Command 
MASS.......................................................................................Marine air support squadron 
MAW....................................................................................................Marine aircraft wing 
Mbps......................................................................................................megabits per second 
MCDP.............................................................................Marine Corps doctrine publication 
MCS.................................................................................MAGTF communications system 
MCWP.......................................................................Marine Corps warfighting publication 
MEB.......................................................................................Marine expeditionary brigade 
MEF............................................................................................Marine expeditionary force 
MEU(SOC).....................................Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) 
MILSATCOM..................................................................military satellite communications 
MILSTAR..........................................................military strategic and tactical relay system 
MLG..................................................................................................Marine logistics group 
MOE...............................................................................................measure of effectiveness 
MOP................................................................................................measure of performance 
MTACS....................................................................Marine tactical air command squadron 
MWCS....................................................................Marine wing communications squadron 
NASA........................................................National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NAVSTAR...........................................................Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging 
NDS.............................................................................................National Defense Strategy 
NIPR...........................................................................Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router 
NMS.............................................................................................National Military Strategy 
NRZ..........................................................................................................non-return-to-zero 
NSS..............................................................................................National Security Strategy 
OEF..............................................................................Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 
OIF.........................................................................................Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 
ORD..............................................................................operational requirements document 
OTP....................................................................................................................on the pause 
PEI............................................................................................................principal end item 
PNT................................................................................positioning, navigation, and timing 
POS/NAV.........................................................................................position and navigation 
REGT.......................................................................................................................regiment 
SAASM...................................................................selective availability anti-spoof module 
SATCOM.......................................................................................satellite communications 
SIPR....................................................................................Secure Internet Protocol Router 
SMART-T.............................................Secure Mobile Antijam Reliable Tactical Terminal 
 xv
STEP...................................................................................standardized tactical entry point 
SWAN......................................................................................Support Wide Area Network 
TGRS...........................................................................Transportable Ground Receive Suite 
TRC.........................................................................................tactical radio communication 
TRI-TAC.....................................................Tri-Service Tactical Communications Program 
TROPO...................................................................................................tropospheric scatter 
TSSR..................................................tropospheric scatter (TROPO)-satellite support radio 
TSST...................................................................................Tactical SHF Satellite Terminal 
UFO.......................................................................................ultrahigh frequency follow-on 
UHF........................................................................................................ultrahigh frequency 
USMC........................................................................................United States Marine Corps 
VSAT........................................................................................very small aperture terminal 
WB..........................................................................................................................wideband 
WGS................................................................Wideband Global Satellite Communications 
 
 xvi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xvii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to thank our thesis advisor, Professor Racoosin, for his guidance 
and insight.  We also want to thank Professor Welch for his support and advice.  We 
appreciate their remarkable ability to quickly turn around their revisions.  They made this 
thesis possible.  We would also like to make the following individual acknowledgments. 
 
Zaffrenarda King: 
I would like to thank my family who has put up with the many hours of writing, 
frustration, and stress.  Without their understanding and support, this entire endeavor 




Thanks are due to my family and friends for their support and encouragement.  I 
want to especially thank Monique for all of her help and encouragement along the way.  I 
would also like to express my gratitude to all of those I have worked with or served under 
over the last few years, all of whom have contributed in some way towards allowing me 
the opportunity to be here to write a thesis.  Last but not least, I owe a big thanks to my 
co-author for his dedication towards completing this thesis. 
 
 xviii





Satellite communications (SATCOM) are critical to military command and 
control (C2) because our operations are evolving to coordinate operations and effects 
between widely dispersed (beyond line of sight) forces. 
[CJCS Instruction 6250.01 Satellite Communications states that] 
SATCOM is critical for all military operations in support of the National 
Military Security Strategy [sic].  Military forces are dependent on space-
based communications to provide essential information services in the 
execution of land, sea, air, and space operations. (CJCS, 1998, p. A-1) 
SATCOM plays a key role in current operations, and that relationship will likely become 
more critical in future operations.  Operating concepts, emerging technologies, and 
operational requirements continually evolve.  The C2 infrastructure must progress at the 
same rate or faster in order to enable current operating concepts and meet the 
requirements of the warfighter.  In essence, our evolving needs and requirements for C2 
systems, capabilities, and associated attributes such as capacity, security, range, coverage, 
and timeliness should drive incremental improvements of our systems and capabilities.  
Beyond line of sight (LOS) is an important concept in military communications because 
conventional military doctrine has dictated that we mass forces; however, now we mass 
effects from fewer, more widely dispersed forces. 
[Doctrine is defined by Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02) as the] 
fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof 
guide their actions in support of national objectives.  It is authoritative but 
requires judgment in application. (CJCS, 2010, p. 143) 
Therefore, capabilities in the domain of beyond LOS systems, such as wideband (WB) 
SATCOM, must periodically be assessed for alignment with relevant strategy, policy, and 
doctrinal publications. 
This thesis will examine the current National Security Strategy (NSS) to gain 
insight into national goals and priorities, and their impact on future military operations.  
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) must be prepared to meet all future challenges, 
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and SATCOM capabilities are a key enabler.  Department of Defense (DoD) and 
Department of the Navy (DON) strategy documents, along with USMC doctrinal 
publications, drive how the USMC operates.  They also have an impact on planning for 
future acquisitions.  A clear understanding of specific policy and doctrinal requirements 
allows for an accurate assessment of what beyond LOS WB SATCOM capabilities the 
USMC requires in order to prepare for the future. 
A clear understanding of desired capabilities allows for an examination of the 
SATCOM interoperability requirements.  In a joint and coalition environment consisting 
of numerous systems, it is vital to ensure that the systems provide requirements-based 
capabilities and are interoperable.  JP 1-02 defines coalition as "An ad hoc arrangement 
between two or more nations for common action" (CJCS, 2010, p. 76).  Joint "connotes 
activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military 
Departments participate" (CJCS, 2010, p. 243).  These definitions provide the context for 
understanding the interoperability requirements.  A clear understanding of requirements 
is crucial to meeting the needs of all stakeholders in a joint and coalition force. 
In addition, this thesis will suggest some best practices that should be applied in 
order to get the most value out of SATCOM acquisitions.  Such best practices include 
continuous process improvement (CPI), product lines, and capability portfolio 
management. 
The general area of research is the concept of operations (CONOPS) for USMC 
beyond LOS WB SATCOM.  This research entails an examination of all pertinent 
national, DoD, and service-specific documents that outline strategy, policy, concepts, and 
provide vision for future warfighting requirements.  The Marine Corps Vision and 
Strategy 2025 predicts that future missions will cover a broad range of operations against 
geographically dispersed enemies (USMC, 2008, p. 13).  There is no current beyond LOS 
WB SATCOM CONOPS describing how to leverage such capabilities in support of 
future USMC plans.  The thesis will focus on considerations for future beyond LOS WB 
SATCOM capabilities for the USMC.  This thesis research is sponsored by Marine Corps 
Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM). 
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B. PURPOSE 
This thesis provides an analysis of a broad range of publications that extend from 
national level strategy documents down to service level doctrinal publications that 
specifically address how we conduct military operations.  A guiding principle throughout 
our research is to look for the best ways to conduct operations in keeping with USMC 
doctrine.  As we analyze beyond LOS SATCOM systems, our focus is to identify how 
they can best support the key tenets of the NSS and USMC doctrine with the goal of 
providing a foundation for a proposed CONOPS that is consistent with the framework 
provided in the policy documents. 
Although SATCOM is a big part of beyond LOS systems, this thesis does not 
propose to limit the research to SATCOM systems.  It will include aspects that illustrate 
how these beyond LOS systems fit in within the context of other related DoD and USMC 
systems.  In addition, best practices will be discussed on a general level, not specific to 
certain systems.  Issues discussed will be broad enough to apply to various programs. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research primarily attempts to answer the following questions: 
1. What does the current NSS suggest for the future of USMC SATCOM? 
2. Given DoD and DON strategy and policy documents, and taking into 
account the NSS and USMC doctrinal principles, what are the recommended beyond 
LOS wideband SATCOM capabilities? 
3. What are the interoperability requirements? 
4. What industry and DoD acquisition best practices should be applied to get 
the recommended capabilities to the warfighter quickly and cost effectively? 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis will provide an analytical foundation to help shape future USMC 
SATCOM operational concepts.  It will also provide a schematic link that illustrates the 
interconnectedness between the tenets of the NSS and military CONOPS for beyond LOS 
 4
wideband SATCOM systems.  Additionally, it may aid in planning for future SATCOM 
systems acquisitions or at the least help to shape USMC requirements that must be 
satisfied by new systems. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of the following steps: 
1. Analyzed DoD, DON, and USMC high-level policy documents and other 
publications related to or impacting commercial and military SATCOM use. 
2. Assessed current USMC SATCOM systems and capabilities. 
3. Analyzed capability considerations for future beyond LOS wideband 
SATCOM systems and capabilities that will best support USMC warfighting operations. 
Based on the above literature analysis and the future capability considerations, the thesis 
provides a foundation for a proposed CONOPS for the USMC that will help to best 
leverage beyond LOS wideband SATCOM capabilities and get the most value out of 
current and future systems. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This research is divided into five sections with Chapter I providing the 
background context and purpose for researching this topic.  Chapter II offers an analysis 
of the NSS and other policy documents that drive operational capabilities.  An analysis of 
the as-is state of USMC operational SATCOM systems and capabilities is presented in 
Chapter III.  Chapter IV explores some future capability considerations, along with some 
interoperability concerns and best practices related to systems acquisitions.  The final 
section, Chapter V, concludes the research and suggests areas for further study in the 
future. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND CONCEPTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section provides an analysis of various high-level strategy, policy, and 
doctrinal publications, ranging from the national level to the service component level.  
The goal of this analysis is to extract key guiding principles that should be considered as 
we assess and define equipment capabilities.  These include national objectives, directly 
stated or implied statements guiding military operations or equipment acquisitions, and 
statements either in support of or in opposition to the use and development of SATCOM. 
Achieving the objectives of the NMS [National Military Strategy] in an 
uncertain and complex environment requires a capabilities-based approach 
to force design and planning that focuses less on a specific adversary or 
where a conflict might occur and more on how an adversary might fight. 
This capabilities-based approach uses operating concepts to drive planning 
and to guide the development of warfighting capabilities. (CJCS, 2004, p. 
3) 
The information gleaned from the analysis of the strategy, policy, and doctrinal 
documents will serve as the foundation upon which to assess current USMC SATCOM 
capabilities and develop considerations for future USMC beyond LOS wideband 
SATCOM capabilities. 
B. ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DOCUMENTS 
This section is devoted to analysis of documents from the Office of the President, 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS). 
1. National Security Strategy 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America is a 
document prepared periodically by the executive branch of the government which 
outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the 
administration plans to deal with them.  President Barack Obama (2010) states, in his 
prefatory comments to the NSS, "we will maintain the military superiority that has 
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secured our country, and underpinned global security, for decades."  The United States of 
America will continue to underwrite global security around the globe.  The NSS 
recognizes that there is a fundamental connection between our national security and our 
national competitiveness (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 1).  Investments made in 
science and innovation will contribute to our strength (Office of the President, The, 2010, 
p. 2). 
The NSS notes that we promote universal values by living them at home.  This 
strategy includes supporting the spread of technologies that facilitate the freedom to 
access information.  Successfully implementing the agenda described in the NSS requires 
that we "maintain our military's conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to 
defeat asymmetric threats" (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 5).  Military superiority 
should include a focus on information superiority because, while the NSS supports the 
spread of technologies that facilitate access to information, it also notes the following.  
"In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, the free flow of information, people, 
goods and services has accelerated at an unprecedented rate.  This interconnection has 
empowered individuals for good and ill.” (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 7) 
The NSS lists many threats to our national security, to include the vulnerability of 
space and cyberspace.  "The space and cyberspace capabilities that power our daily lives 
and military operations are vulnerable to disruption and attack." (Office of the President, 
The, 2010, p. 8)  Defending against these threats "requires networks that are secure, 
trustworthy, and resilient.  Our digital infrastructure, therefore, is a strategic national 
asset, and protecting it—while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties—is a national 
security priority." (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 27) 
The NSS aims to update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American 
power.  Key actions and priorities in regards to Defense are summarized in the NSS as 
follows: 
We are strengthening our military to ensure that it can prevail in today’s 
wars; to prevent and deter threats against the United States, its interests, 
and our allies and partners; and prepare to defend the United States in a 
wide range of contingencies against state and nonstate actors.  We will 
continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, 
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counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly 
sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address 
the full range of military operations.  This includes preparing for 
increasingly sophisticated adversaries, deterring and defeating aggression 
in anti-access environments, and defending the United States and 
supporting civil authorities at home. (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 
14) 
The NSS offers the assurance that the military will continue "to have the 
necessary capabilities across all domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyber" (Office of the 
President, The, 2010, p. 22).  The NSS promotes investments in science and innovation.  
It also supports maintaining American military superiority.  Once again, the NSS notes 
that protecting our information and communication infrastructure is a national security 
priority (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 31).  These concepts can be linked 
together in the NSS section about economic prosperity, which states that, “we must also 
ensure that America stays on the cutting edge of the science and innovation that supports 
our prosperity, defense, and international technological leadership" (Office of the 
President, The, 2010, p. 28).  Beyond that, the NSS says, "We must continue to 
encourage cutting-edge space technology by investing in the people and industrial base 
that develops them.  We will invest in the research and development of next-generation 
space technologies and capabilities" (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 31).  To that 
end, the NSS can serve as a foundation upon which to develop new concepts, 
technologies, and hardware related to SATCOM.  Additionally, since these capabilities 
and technologies are essential across national security and not just within the military, 1) 
the people who comprise the military will increasingly come from a culture that is 
intimately familiar with and demanding of broad access to information and, 2) industry 
will be working to meet these needs, and the military will be "swimming with the 
current" as opposed to working against it as we seek more and more capability. 
2. National Space Policy of the United States of America 
The National Space Policy of the United States of America (NSP) lends support to 
continued use of SATCOM as well.  "Satellites contribute to increased transparency and 
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stability among nations and provide a vital communications path for avoiding potential 
conflicts” (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 1). 
The NSP also warns of serious challenges that we now face to our continued 
successful use of space.  Two issues stand out as concerns.  There are an increasing 
number of nations and organizations using space.  In other words, space is getting more 
crowded with both systems and debris.  In addition, the benefits of space permeate almost 
every aspect of our lives, and those space capabilities are interconnected.  The shrinking 
margin for error in space, coupled with our growing dependence on space capabilities, 
means that the stakes are very high and that mishaps or irresponsible acts in space can 
result in damaging and very costly consequences (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 
1). 
Despite the increasing risks, it appears that our dependence on the benefits 
provided by space systems will persist.  One of the stated goals in the NSP for the United 
States is to, "Energize competitive domestic industries to participate in global markets 
and advance the development of:  satellite manufacturing; satellite-based services; space 
launch; terrestrial applications; and increased entrepreneurship” (Office of the President, 
The, 2010, p. 4).  In order to meet the directive's goals, the NSP states that all 
departments and agencies shall strengthen American leadership in space-related science, 
technology, and industrial bases.   
Departments and agencies shall:  conduct basic and applied research that 
increases capabilities and decreases costs, where this research is best 
supported by the government; encourage an innovative and entrepreneurial 
commercial space sector; and help ensure the availability of space-related 
industrial capabilities in support of critical government functions. (Office 
of the President, The, 2010, p. 5) 
In addition, the NSP provides specific guidance in regards to acquisition of space 
capabilities and services.  The NSP favors commercial space capabilities and services – 
where they fully meet government agency requirements – in order to promote a robust 
domestic commercial space industry.  Departments and agencies are directed to 
"purchase and use commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum practical 
extent" or to modify commercial solutions, to include use of inventive, nontraditional 
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arrangements such as public-private partnerships, unless there is a national security or 
public safety issue (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 10). 
It is worth noting that one of the other stated goals in the NSP mitigates some of 
the risks associated with continued reliance on space systems.  The NSP calls for, 
"domestic and international measures to promote safe and responsible operations in 
space; improved information collection and sharing for space object collision avoidance; 
protection of critical space systems and supporting infrastructures, with special attention 
to the critical interdependence of space and information systems; and strengthening 
measures to mitigate orbital debris" (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 4).  The NSP 
also directs NASA and the DoD to “Pursue research and development of technologies 
and techniques, through the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and the Secretary of Defense, to mitigate and remove on-orbit 
debris, reduce hazards, and increase understanding of the current and future debris 
environment” (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 7). 
Also in line with mitigating the risks associated with reliance on space systems—
and this is vital now that we are “entangled” with our technologies (Hillis, 2010)—the 
NSP directs that the United States shall: 
• Assure space-enabled mission-essential functions by developing the 
techniques, measures, relationships, and capabilities necessary to maintain 
continuity of services; 
−Such efforts may include enhancing the protection and resilience 
of selected spacecraft and supporting infrastructure; 
• Develop and exercise capabilities and plans for operating in and through 
a degraded, disrupted, or denied space environment for the purposes of 
maintaining mission-essential functions; and 
• Address mission assurance requirements and space system resilience in 
the acquisition of future space capabilities and supporting infrastructure. 
(Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 9) 
In other words, despite our continued use, development of, and reliance upon space-based 
communications, the NSP indicates that we should give attention to designing, building, 
and operating our space systems (which includes the spacecraft, supporting ground 
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infrastructure, and the communications links between them), such that at least the critical 
functions are available to at least the essential users in a contested environment. 
3. National Defense Strategy 
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is published periodically in order to update 
how the DoD will contribute to achieving the NSS objectives.  Lessons learned from 
previous operations, along with an assessment of the strategic environment and the tools 
available to the DoD, provide the basis for the new NDS.  The 2008 NDS is based upon 
the 2006 version of the NSS; it has been included among the documents analyzed for this 
thesis because it is the most current version available. 
The NDS forecasts continued engagement across the globe.  "Beyond our shores, 
America shoulders additional responsibilities on behalf of the world" (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 1).  Space and cyber threats are listed among the 
challenges facing the United States. 
The United States, our allies, and our partners face a spectrum of 
challenges, including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile 
states armed with weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers, 
emerging space and cyber threats, natural and pandemic disasters, and a 
growing competition for resources.  The Department of Defense must 
respond to these challenges while anticipating and preparing for those of 
tomorrow. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 1) 
The NDS states that, "We must also consider the possibility of challenges by 
more powerful states.  Some may actively seek to counter the United States in some or all 
domains of traditional warfare or to gain an advantage by developing capabilities that 
offset our own" (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 3). 
China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the 
United States. For the foreseeable future, we will need to hedge against 
China’s growing military modernization and the impact of its strategic 
choices upon international security.  It is likely that China will continue to 
expand its conventional military capabilities, emphasizing anti-access and 
area denial assets including developing a full range of long-range strike, 
space, and information warfare capabilities. (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2008, p. 3) 
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With regards to China, the NDS says that American fielded combat capabilities should 
preserve and enhance U.S. national advantages over time (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2008, p. 3). 
The Department will respond to China’s expanding military power, and to 
the uncertainties over how it might be used, through shaping and hedging.  
This approach tailors investment of substantial, but not infinite, resources 
in ways that favor key enduring U.S. strategic advantages.  At the same 
time, we will continue to improve and refine our capabilities to respond to 
China if necessary. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 10)  
Russia is another country that could have security implications for the United States due 
to its retreat from democracy and increasing intimidation of its neighbors (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 3 and 10). 
The NDS notes that over the next twenty years, population, resource, energy, 
climatic, and environmental pressures could combine in unpredictable and complex ways 
with social, cultural, technological, and geopolitical change of unprecedented speed and 
scale to create greater uncertainty (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 4).  The 
NDS paints a picture of a future world that is economically more interdependent, but also 
increasingly sensitive to crises and shocks as countries strive to balance energy demand 
for economic development with climate change.  So, the U.S. Armed Forces will need to 
be able to fight on short notice, anywhere, anytime.  SATCOM is currently the only way 
to meet the communications needs of this environment.  When our first forces hit the 
ground in Afghanistan in late 2001—a distant, remote, mountainous country with no 
infrastructure—SATCOM was the only way to communicate with them. 
The NDS proposes that developments within science and technology, while 
presenting some potential threats, "may reduce many of the pressures and risks suggested 
by physical trends" (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 5).  The decisions we 
make regarding equipment and capabilities we develop should reduce the risks associated 
with the trends, and should allow the DoD to hedge against uncertainty; capabilities 
should provide agility, flexibility, and interoperability (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2008, p. 5).  This has significant implications for SATCOM capabilities. 
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As in the NSS, the NDS also notes that the flow of goods, services, people, 
technology and information grows every year, but that terrorists and others seek to 
exploit the openness brought about by globalization.  As part of its overall strategy to 
protect the country, the U.S. Armed Forces will continue deployments at sea, in the air, 
on land, and in space (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 6).  SATCOM is an 
important component that enables the continued use of this strategy. 
One of the ways in which the DoD will achieve its objectives is by securing U.S. 
strategic access and retaining freedom of action.  The NDS notes the following: 
For more than sixty years, the United States has secured the global 
commons for the benefit of all.  Global prosperity is contingent on the free 
flow of ideas, goods, and services.  The enormous growth in trade has 
lifted millions of people out of poverty by making locally produced goods 
available on the global market.  Low barriers to trade also benefit 
consumers by reducing the cost of goods and allowing countries to 
specialize.  None of this is possible without a basic belief that goods 
shipped through air or by sea, or information transmitted under the ocean 
or through space, will arrive at their destination safely.  The development 
and proliferation of anti-access technologies and tactics threatens to 
undermine this belief. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 16) 
The above suggests that global prosperity depends partially on the ability to 
transmit information through space with a reasonable level of information assurance.  It 
also suggests that the DoD considers space to be part of the global commons.  The Outer 
Space Treaty (formally known as The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies) does indeed state that outer space shall be free for use by all states (United 
Nations, 2002, p. 4).  "The United States requires freedom of action in the global 
commons and strategic access to important regions of the world to meet our national 
security needs" (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 16).  The NDS implies, 
therefore, that SATCOM is considered by the DoD to be required for national security. 
The NDS also states that the DoD will increasingly leverage and transform to a 
more agile continental U.S. based expeditionary total force (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2008, p. 16).  This has implications for design of SATCOM equipment.  
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Historically, the USMC has strived to be light and expeditionary.  This trend should 
certainly continue, based on the NDS, as it develops SATCOM systems. 
"Technology and equipment are the tools of the Total Force, and we must give 
our people what they need, and the best resources, to get the job done.  First-class 
technology means investing in the right kinds of technology at the right time." (Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 19)  Accordingly, it can be said that the NDS lends 
support towards continued development of SATCOM technology for the USMC, as long 
as there is a legitimate need and it is in line with USMC operating concepts. 
It should also be noted, however, that "China is developing technologies to 
disrupt our traditional advantages.  Examples include development of anti-satellite 
capabilities and cyber warfare." (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 22)  Indeed, 
in January of 2007, China fired a missile and struck an aging Chinese satellite orbiting at 
an altitude of 537 miles (Singer, Clark, 2007).  Furthermore, a U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission contracted research paper entitled An Assessment of 
China's Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies and Doctrines describes 30 
Chinese-written proposals for anti-satellite capabilities to include jamming, missiles, 
laser beams, and plasma weapons. 
[In each of their books, three Chinese colonels] advocated covert 
deployment of a sophisticated antisatellite weapon system to be used 
against United States in a surprise manner without warning.  Even a small 
scale antisatellite attack in a crisis against 50 US satellites [assuming a 
mix of targeted military reconnaissance, navigation satellites, and 
communication satellites] could have a catastrophic effect not only on US 
military forces, but of the US civilian economy. (Pillsbury, 2007, p. 3) 
Consequently, the NDS mandates the following: 
The Department will invest in hedging against the loss or disruption of our 
traditional advantages, not only through developing mitigation strategies, 
but also by developing alternative or parallel means to the same end.  This 
diversification parallelism is distinct from acquiring overmatch 
capabilities (whereby we have much more than an adversary of a similar 
capability).  It will involve pursuing multiple routes to similar effects 
while ensuring that such capabilities are applicable across multiple 
mission areas. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 22) 
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The above explicitly states that the DoD must diversify its equipment assets in order to 
have redundant and assorted capabilities.  In other words, while the NDS allows for 
continued use of SATCOM, it also clearly requires that the military have alternate 
communications equipment that is similar in capability but not space-based.  This has 
some implications for determining the right mix of communications capabilities.  
However, it does not negate the continued requirement for USMC SATCOM capabilities. 
4. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (NMS) is a 
document published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).  It is informed 
by the NSS and NDS, and provides strategic direction to the U.S. Armed Forces.  "The 
NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military 
objectives and joint operating concepts from which the Service Chiefs and combatant 
commanders identify desired capabilities" (CJCS, 2004, p. 2). 
The NMS states that the following principles guide the development of joint 
operations concepts and capabilities:  strategic agility, decisiveness, and integration with 
other instruments of power.  It further directs that combatant commanders must consider 
these principles in planning and conducting operations.  Agility is defined as "the ability 
to rapidly deploy, employ, sustain and redeploy capabilities in geographically separated 
and environmentally diverse regions" (CJCS, 2004, p. 7), a niche for which SATCOM is 
particularly well-suited.  These principles and other guidance from the CJCS do not apply 
only to the people in the U.S. Armed Forces; they should also drive the development of 
equipment and capabilities that enable the joint force to meet its military objectives. 
The NMS describes the security environment as a more complex and distributed 
battlespace, with a wider range of adversaries with access to technology (CJCS, 2004, p. 
viii).  The NMS repeats the NDS in stating that the DoD "must work to secure strategic 
access to key regions, lines of communication and the “global commons” of international 
waters, airspace, space and cyberspace" (CJCS, 2004, p. 1).  Again, as in the NDS, the 
NMS describes information assurance as a critical element of national security.  "Military 
operations require information assurance that guarantees access to information systems 
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and their products and the ability to deny adversaries access to the same.  Securing the 
battlespace includes actions to safeguard information and command and control systems" 
(CJCS, 2004, p. 18). 
The NMS calls for increasingly joint and interoperable capabilities that combine 
the strengths of each service component and other agencies. 
Joint forces will require new levels of interoperability and systems that are 
“born joint,” i.e., conceptualized and designed with joint architectures and 
acquisition strategies.  This level of interoperability ensures that technical, 
doctrinal and cultural barriers do not limit the ability of joint commanders 
to achieve objectives. (CJCS, 2004, p. 15) 
The above statement describes one of the strengths of military SATCOM, as there are no 
service component-specific MILSATCOM systems.  In addition to interoperability, the 
NMS also touches on the importance of compatibility and information sharing.  Such 
attributes may also impact SATCOM concepts. 
Achieving shared situational awareness with allies and partners will 
require compatible information systems and security processes that protect 
sensitive information without degrading the ability of multinational 
partners to operate effectively with US elements.  Such information and 
intelligence sharing helps builds trust and confidence essential to strong 
international partnerships. (CJCS, 2004, p. 17) 
The NMS calls for the U.S. Armed Forces to "win decisively" where necessary.  
This "will include actions to: destroy an adversary’s military capabilities through the 
integrated application of air, ground, maritime, space and information capabilities" 
(CJCS, 2004, p. 14).  It further states that the joint forces "require expeditionary 
capabilities with highly mobile forces skilled in flexible, adaptive planning and 
decentralized execution even when operating from widely dispersed locations".  Only 
SATCOM can support this.  Even though the U.S. government has very high capacity 
terrestrial communications across the globe (the Global Information Grid, or GIG), it 
cannot meet the expeditionary or mobile needs.  Something is needed for the "last mile" 
and with dispersed forces, only SATCOM meets the beyond LOS need.  A critical aspect 
is to then tie the beyond LOS SATCOM into the GIG so that the mobile, tactical user has 
access to services and products available through the GIG.  SATCOM is less secure and 
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reliable and has much less capacity than the GIG.  It should be used when no other 
capability exists and provide access to the GIG as soon as possible for those users 
needing Non-secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR), Secure Internet Protocol Router, 
(SIPR), and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)-type 
services. 
The NMS elaborates on expeditionary capabilities in saying that "power 
projection requires assured access to theaters of operation and enhanced expeditionary 
capabilities that support operational maneuver from strategic distances" (CJCS, 2004, p. 
16). 
The NMS describes the desired attributes of the joint force as follows: 
• Fully Integrated—functions and capabilities focused toward a unified 
purpose. 
• Expeditionary—rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable 
throughout the global battlespace. 
• Networked—linked and synchronized in time and purpose. 
• Decentralized—integrated capabilities operating in a joint manner at 
lower echelons. 
• Adaptable—prepared to quickly respond with the appropriate 
capabilities mix. 
• Decision superiority—better-informed decisions implemented faster than 
an adversary can react. 
• Lethality—destroy an adversary and/or his systems in all conditions. 
(CJCS, 2004, p. 15) 
The NMS supports actions that help create a more network-centric force and that 
lead to greater decision superiority (CJCS, 2004, p. 27).  Decision superiority is 
supported by superior intelligence and the power of information technologies (CJCS, 
2004, p. 16).  Furthermore, "A networked force capable of decision superiority can 
collect, analyze and rapidly disseminate intelligence and other relevant information from 
the national to tactical levels, then use that information to decide and act faster than 
opponents" (CJCS, 2004, p. 16).  "Battlespace awareness, combined with responsive 
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command and control systems, supports dynamic decision-making and turns information 
superiority into a competitive advantage adversaries cannot match" (CJCS, 2004, p. 19). 
In addition, the NMS requires that the U.S. overseas presence be scalable in order 
to improve our ability to deal with uncertainty, enable rapid operations and allow forces 
to respond with greater speed than in the past (CJCS, 2004, p. 25).  The NMS supports 
continued development of technology in saying the Armed Forces must "leverage 
innovation and technology and act decisively in pursuit of national goals" (CJCS, 2004, 
p. 15).  The USMC must consider the attributes alluded to above as it develops its 
communications equipment concepts and requirements.  These include attributes such as 
interoperability, mobility, netcentricity, adaptability, and scalability. 
C. ANALYSIS OF SERVICE DOCUMENTS 
This section is devoted to an analysis of maritime concepts and doctrine. 
1. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is a unified maritime strategy, 
the first ever produced.  It is jointly signed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
(CMC), the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and the Commandant of the Coast Guard 
(COMDT COGARD).  The purpose of the document is to describe how the United States 
will apply seapower around the world in order to meet our strategic objectives.  The 
document states that "Our Nation’s interests are best served by fostering a peaceful global 
system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people 
and governance" (CMC, CNO, & COMDT COGARD, 2007, p. 4).  It implies a 
continued need for expeditionary and versatile forces such as the Marine Corps by noting 
that "the maritime domain—the world’s oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal 
areas, littorals, and the airspace above them—supports 90 percent of the world’s trade, it 
carries the lifeblood of a global system that links every country on earth" (CMC, CNO, & 
COMDT COGARD, 2007, p. 4). 
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2. Marine Corps Operating Concepts 
The Marine Corps overarching operating capabilities are outlined succinctly in the 
Marine Corps Operating Concepts (MOC) manual.  Some of the key underlying 
purposes of this publication are to inspire discussion, debate, and innovation (Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command, 2010, p. 11).  This document lays the foundation 
and provides reference points that guide future capability development and improve the 
way the Marine Corps operates and how it contributes to national security (Marine 
Administrative Message 415/10, 2010).  
The U.S. Marine Corps role in implementing our national security policy is 
largely attributable to its naval character and responsiveness to missions across the range 
of military missions as defined by Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations (JP 3-0).  In an 
effort to fulfill its role in meeting the Nation’s evolving strategic needs, the Marine Corps 
has historically continuously revised its organization, training, and equipment (Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command, 2010, p. 2).  Marine Corps forces perform a 
variety of missions across the range of military operations.  The spectrum of military 
operations from a strategic context includes all military capabilities and is outlined in 
joint doctrine as types of military operations.  The types of military operations span a 
wide spectrum and include major operations, enforcement of sanctions, 
counterinsurgency operations, and foreign humanitarian assistance to list a few.  JP 3-0 
defines the range of military operations and provides a comprehensive listing of the types 
of military operations.  
Military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a 
range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and 
deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations 
and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns (CJCS, 2010, p. I-7).  
Since the Marine Corps is organized, trained, and equipped to operate from the 
sea as an integral component of the naval team its actions are focused around assuring 
littoral access and responding to crisis.  As a consequence, Marines will be faced with 
situations where they will have to rely on beyond line of sight systems and other non-
terrestrial means to connect to the Global Information Grid.  The MOC indicates that 
future missions for Marines will fall in a broad yet narrower range of operations that 
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include: Major Combat Operations (MCO), Preemptive MCO with limited forward 
access, Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Operations, and Counterinsurgency Operations 
(COIN) (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2010). 
D. SUMMARY 
The analysis of the strategies, policies, and concepts indicate that there will 
continue to be a requirement for robust SATCOM capabilities.  Some of the key 
principles elucidated by the analysis of the documents include the following.  National 
policies specifically encourage space and satellite-related activities, along with 
technologies that facilitate access to information.  DoD documents warn of emerging 
threats to space-based systems but remain committed to their continued use, calling for 
capability diversification to counter threats.  The Armed Forces are expected to become 
increasingly joint and expeditionary.  Only SATCOM, with its capacity, range, and 
coverage, can legitimately support expeditionary forces; expeditionary forces are 
essential to meeting national and military objectives.  The Marine Corps must be 
prepared to respond to a broad range of operations without much warning time.  
SATCOM enables that critical capability. 
Desired characteristics for the forces and capabilities that were specifically 
mentioned in the documents include attributes such as secure, trustworthy, resilient, 
protected, expeditionary, mobile, agile, flexible, interoperable, rapidly deployable and 
redeployable, sustainable, compatible, integrated, networked, decentralized, adaptable, 
scalable, fast, versatile.  Other attributes that should be considered include capacity, 
security, range, coverage, and timeliness.  These considerations, in the context of the 
security environment and the vision for the future presented in the documents that were 
analyzed, form the basis upon which the next two chapters will discuss current USMC 
SATCOM capabilities and considerations for the future. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The current SATCOM capabilities are designed to support a commander’s C2 
requirements for all contingencies within the range of military operations.  Since the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process was put in place in 
June 2003, DoD systems and family of systems (FoS) have been designed and fielded to 
support operating capabilities that have been defined by the services.  JCIDS employs a 
capabilities-based approach to identify current needs and future gaps in our ability to 
carry out joint warfighting missions and functions.  The primary mechanism used to 
highlight and identify these requirements is the Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) 
process.  The CBA helps show the interrelationship between the JCIDS and Acquisition 
Processes.  
All CBAs are based on a framework of strategic guidance documents.  
The National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Strategy for Homeland 
Defense, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military 
Strategy (NMS) provide the overarching description of the Nation’s 
defense interests, objectives, and priorities.  In addition, the Guidance for 
the Development of the Force, the Guidance for the Employment of the 
Force, and the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report contain 
further refinement of objectives and priorities, and help provide a 
framework for a CBA. (JCIDS Manual, 2009, p. A-1) 
The CBA is important because it begins by identifying the mission or military problem to 
be assessed, the concepts to be examined, the timeframe in which the problem is being 
assessed, and the scope of the assessment (JCIDS Manual, 2009, p. A-3). 
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan that resulted in Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM have revealed some capability gaps and 
emphasized the need for dispersed, mobile, warfighting elements.  There is also evidence 
that this dynamic applies to support elements as well.  The dynamics of the modern 
battlefield continue to evolve and become more complex just as the requirements to 
support the associated command and control functions increase as well.  There are several 
factors that contribute to the growth in requirements, such as the maturation and 
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development of new technologies and the adoption of new tactical procedures.  The 
Enhanced Company Operation concept is a prime example of the latter.  The ECO 
concept aims to maximize tactical flexibility through decentralized operations in 
dispersed, distributed environments (Price, 2009, p. 6).  This dispersion and 
decentralization of forces increases the C2 requirements, particularly when operating in 
areas where traditional line of sight (LOS) communications are not feasible to support 
operational needs.  In such cases, the deficiency must be filled with beyond line of sight 
communications assets. 
The increasing use and reliance on beyond LOS systems may seem evident due to 
the technology and capabilities that are being leveraged by units within the military; 
however, a GAO report related to Commercial Communications Satellite Services put 
this growth and use into perspective. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to rely on commercial 
satellite communications to plan and support operations.  DoD use of 
commercial satellite bandwidth has increased over the past few years, 
making the department the largest single customer of commercial satellite 
bandwidth. (Government Accountability Office, 2006, p. 1) 
The following two figures illustrate the categories of satellite systems and their salient 




Figure 1. Military and Commercial Satellite Systems (From JP 3-14, 2009) 
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Figure 2. Satellite Communications Systems (From JP 6-0, 2010) 
The trend lines for the bandwidth usage indicate that future requirements will only 
continue to grow.  However, at present our ability to fulfill the bandwidth requirements 
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are somewhat constrained by the policies and equipment that we have today.  If the 
Marine Corps had an emerging need to conduct to a mission within the range of military 
operations today it would be required to plan and execute based on the current inventory 
of systems and capabilities.  In the terms of former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to 
have at a later time (New York Times, 2004).  Therefore, current USMC SATCOM 
capabilities are relegated to the aging limited inventory of legacy systems. 
B. USMC MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF) 
The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, is organized as a general 
purpose “force in readiness” to support national needs. Deploying for combat as 
combined-arms Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), the Marine Corps provides the 
National Command Authorities (NCA) with a responsive force that can conduct 
operations across the spectrum of conflict.(MCCDC,1998, p. 1-1).  The MAGTF is the 
fundamental construct for task-organizing and employing Marine Corps forces across the 
range of military operations (MCCDC, 2010, p.12). 
The MAGTF is the Marine Corps’ principle organization for the conduct 
of all missions across the range of military operations. MAGTFs are 
balanced, combined-arms forces with organic ground, aviation, and 
sustainment elements.  They are flexible, task-organized forces that can 
respond rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world and are able to 
conduct a variety of missions.  Although organized and equipped to 
participate as part of naval expeditionary forces, MAGTFs also have the 
capability to conduct sustained operations ashore.  The MAGTF provides 
a combatant commander or other operational commander with a versatile 
expeditionary force that is capable of responding to a broad range of crisis 
and conflict situations.  MAGTFs are organized, trained, and equipped to 
perform missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping to 
intense combat and can operate in permissive, uncertain, and hostile 
environments.  They may be shore- or sea-based in support of joint and 
multinational major operations and/or campaigns.  MAGTFs deploy as 
amphibious, air-contingency, or maritime prepositioning forces (MPFs), 
either as part of a naval expeditionary force or via strategic lift.  They can 
present a minimal or a highly visible presence and are able to project 
combat power ashore in measured degrees or can provide secure staging 
areas ashore for follow-on forces.  MAGTFs are prepared for immediate 
deployment overseas into austere operating environments, bringing all 
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means necessary to accomplish the mission.  When deployed aboard 
amphibious shipping, MAGTFs maintain a continuous presence at 
strategic locations around the globe and can be rapidly moved to and 
indefinitely stationed at the scene of potential trouble.  The MAGTF 
provides the JFC with the capability of reconstitution, which is the ability 
of an expeditionary force to regenerate, reorganize, replenish, and reorient 
itself for a new mission without having to return to its home base. 
(MCCDC, 1998, p. 2-1) 
In an effort to prepare for the future, the Marine Corps will explore revisions to 
MAGTF tables of organization and equipment, as well as select tactics, techniques, and 
procedures, in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century (MCCDC, 2010, p.6).  
This exploration of revisions would not be complete without considering the wideband 
beyond LOS systems currently employed by the MAGTF. 
C. MAGTF COMMUNICATIONS 
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.3, MAGTF 
Communications System, presents doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for 
the employment of the communications system to support Marine air-ground task force 
(MAGTF) command and control (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2010, 
p. 3).  The SATCOM systems within the MAGTF communications system (MCS) are a 
key component because they enable the warfighter to be globally interconnected to the 
GIG.  SATCOM systems operating in the X-band, C-band, Ku-band, Ka-band, UHF, and 
EHF portions of the radio spectrum provide satellite connectivity to deployed tactical 
users by connecting to the DoD teleport and standardized tactical entry point (STEP).  
The STEP/teleports connect the joint force to the Defense Information Systems Network 
(DISN) long-haul services to provide a reachback capability for DISN voice, data, and 
video services across all frequency bands.  The DISN provides the joint force commander 
(JFC) with the ability to access needed capabilities worldwide (Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 2010, p. 3-2 to 3-5). 
One of the most difficult C2 issues the Marine Corps now faces is the 
requirement to support a deployable Marine Corps component HQ with 
MCS personnel and equipment.  The primary source of support is the 
communications battalion (COMM BN).  The requirement to provide 
support to a deployed Marine Corps component HQ can have a significant 
 27
effect on the availability of MCS resources to support the MAGTF.  The 
MCS must be able to satisfy the C2 requirements of the expeditionary 
battlefield.  It must provide MAGTF commanders and their staffs with the 
tools necessary to collect, process, analyze, and exchange information 
rapidly in support of operations planning and execution.  These systems 
must make the necessary information available when and where it is 
needed on the battlefield.  Employment of these systems must not 
adversely affect the MAGTF’s freedom of action and mobility, and they 
must be reliable, flexible, responsive, and configurable to mission needs.  
The success of the MAGTF on the modern battlefield depends on 
designing, planning, and employing a communications system that 
satisfies the information needs of the MAGTF process. (Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, 2010, p. 8) 
In order to support the information exchange on the battlefield it is important that 
the communication system meet specific attributes that support and enable the warfighter 
on the battlefield.  Whether this battlefield is defined as flat open terrain, desert 
highlands, jungles, mountains, at sea, or near the littorals, the communications system 
must be reliable, secure, timely, flexible, interoperable, and survivable.  The Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) communications system publication elucidates these 
qualities in more detail so definitions are provided below to ensure clarity and to avoid 
ambiguity. 
Reliability - available when needed and perform as intended with low 
failure rates and few errors.  Reliability is also attained by standardizing 
equipment and procedures and by building necessary electronic jamming 
and deception.  Systems should perform reliably on board ships and 
aircraft, in garrison, and in austere field environments. 
Security - should provide security commensurate with the user’s 
requirements and with the vulnerability of the transmission media to 
interception and exploitation.  Security is achieved by using appropriate 
protection and cryptographic systems and transmission security 
techniques.  It is also achieved by educating and training personnel in 
operational, management, and technical security procedures. 
Timeliness - should process and transfer information among decision 
makers rapidly enough to maintain a high tempo of operations.  It should 




Flexibility - should be capable of being reconfigured quickly to respond to 
a rapidly changing environment.  Flexibility can be obtained through 
system design or by using commercial facilities, mobile or transportable 
systems, or prepositioned facilities. 
Interoperability - should enable information to be exchanged among all of 
the commanders and forces involved in an operation.  The MCS also 
should possess the interoperability required to ensure information 
exchange in joint and multinational operations and in operations with 
other government agencies. 
Survivability - refers to the measures taken to prevent disruption of the 
MCS by enemy interference or natural disaster.  Survivability can be 
enhanced by the dispersal and protection of key nodes, physical and 
electromagnetic hardening, and redundancy of communication paths and 
information processing nodes. (Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, 2010, p. 1-6) 
D. CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
The current supporting SATCOM systems inventory for the Marine Corps 
includes a range of systems and terminals that operate at various frequency ranges within 
the spectrum.  In order to facilitate organization, satellite systems have been grouped in a 
manner that includes equipment and terminals that operate in the microwave, super high 
frequency, and extremely high frequency range.  The Marine Corps currently has 
programs of record and family of systems that have been validated through JCIDS and 
designed to satisfy the current operating requirements of the warfighter.  In the case of 
the range of operations outlined in the MOC, existing legacy systems will provide the 
communications backbone and interface to the Global Information Grid (GIG). 
Systems Command, Product Group 12, is the organization that is tasked with the 
primary responsibility to deliver world class communications, intelligence, and 
networking systems and equipment to the operating forces that meet their requirements 
and expectation (Marine Corps Systems Command, 2010, Mission section).  The Marine 
Corp Combat Development Command, Concept of Employment for SATCOM 
Operations publication describes the current SATCOM capabilities as consisting of a 
mixture of terminals with various capabilities.  Some are both MILSATCOM and 
COMMSATCOM capable (dual-band, tri-band, and quad-band); some are 
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COMMSATCOM only, all with a mix of modem capabilities (Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, p.6).  Since the primary area of this research is focused on 
beyond line of sight satellite communications, a listing and description of the systems and 
equipment categorized under the satellite communications program is provided to 
document the systems that provide beyond line of sight communication and related 
SATCOM support for current operating capabilities. 
1. Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver 
(DAGR) 
The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space-based navigation 
and timing system made up of multiple satellites, a ground control system, and any 
number of navigation sets.  The DAGR collects and processes satellite signals from the 
NAVSTAR GPS to provide position, velocity, and time (PVT) information, along with 
position reporting and navigation capabilities (Department of Defense, 2005, p. V). 
The DAGR is a lightweight, hand-held, self-contained, selective availability anti-
spoof module (SAASM) based GPS receiver.  It provides Position, Velocity, Navigation, 
and Timing (PVNT) data using the GPS dual-frequency (L1/L2) Precise Positioning 
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Table 1.   DAGR Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) 
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2. Global Broadcast Service (GBS) Transportable Ground Receive Suite 
(TGRS) 
GBS is a smart-push/user-pull SATCOM system that provides large volumes of 
information to deployed, or garrison forces. The AN/TSR-9 receives and disseminates 
GBS broadcasts at up to 23 Mbps, and is capable of processing both classified and 
unclassified information products such as: Imagery, Intelligence, Video (NTSC and 
Digital), Theater message traffic, Joint and service-unique news, Weather and MWR 
programming.  
Each AN/TSR-9 TGRS consists of a Receive Terminal (including a 1-meter 
parabolic dish antenna), Receive Broadcast Manager Server, Power Controller Unit, 
Crypto (KG-250), Integrated Receiver-Decoder (for NTSC video), Managed Ethernet 
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Table 2.   GBS Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) 
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3. Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) Satellite Communications System 
The AN/TSC-93C/D is a sheltered SHF SATCOM terminal capable of 
simultaneously transmitting and receiving up to 8.448 Mbps on a single multiplexed 
carrier.  It provides voice and data communications to the ground, air, and logistics 
elements of a landing force.  Baseband interfaces also provide connectivity with 
externally-multiplexed TRI-TAC equipment.  The AN/TSC-93 can be used as a non-
nodal terminal in point-to-point links with other SHF SATCOM terminals, or it can 
operate in conjunction with the AN/TSC-85 as part of a network.  The AN/TSC-93 is 
configured to operate with the AS-3036_, AS-4429D Large Aperture Multiband 
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Comm Bn   N/A   N/A   N/A  
Table 3.   GMF Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) 
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4. Lightweight Multi-Band Satellite Terminal (LMST)  
The AN/USC-65(V)1 and AN/USC-65(V)2 are SHF quad-band (C-band, X-band, 
Ku-band, and Ka-band) wideband satellite communications ground terminals. The LMST 
provides a smaller, lighter, modular, more flexible terminal with a hub and spoke 
capability. The LMST is packaged in two configurations consisting of three or four 
transit cases and one 2.5-meter antenna.  It has the capability to simultaneously transmit 
two (one mission and one orderwire) communications carriers and receive seven (six 
mission and one orderwire) communications carriers through either the terminal’s 
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Comm Bn   N/A   Comm Sqdn   N/A  
Table 4.   LMST Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) 
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5. Phoenix Tactical SHF Satellite Terminal (TSST) 
The AN/TSC-156 Phoenix is a Quad-band Tactical Super High Frequency 
satellite communications terminal mounted on an M1152A1 vehicular platform.  A 
second vehicle s provided for logistics support.  Phoenix is capable of operating over 
military X-and Ka-band satellites and C- and Ku-band over commercial satellites.  The 
Phoenix will support one network consisting of up to four enhanced tactical satellite 
processors (ETSSP) multiplexed full-duplex links.  The Phoenix is configured to operate 
with either the system’s internal antenna in C-, X-, Ku-, and Ka-band, or with the AS-
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Comm Bn   N/A   N/A   N/A  
Table 5.   TSST Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) 
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6. Tropospheric Scatter Microwave Radio Terminal 
The AN/TRC-170 is a transportable, self-enclosed troposcatter terminal 
(multichannel) capable of transmitting and receiving digital data over varying distances 
(up to 100 miles).  This terminal is comprised of modular electronic equipment in various 
configurations with government-furnished equipment (GFE) multiplexers and 
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Comm Bn   N/A   MACG, MAW   N/A  
Table 6.   TRC-170 Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) 
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7. Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T) and 
Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Planning Tool  
The SMART-T provides tactical users with secure, jam-resistant data and voice 
satellite communications up to 2.24 Mbps via MILSTAR Extremely High Frequency 
(EHF) satellites and compatible payloads.  In addition, the SMART-T provides Marine 
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders with extremely reliable, survivable, long-
haul connectivity for core command and control links.  The AN/TSC-154A Advanced 
EHF (AEHF) upgrade, together with the AN/PYQ-14 AEHF planning tool will enable 
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Comm Bn   Comm Co   N/A   N/A  
Table 7.   SMART-T Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & 
Equipment, 2009) 
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8. Support Wide Area Network (SWAN) 
SWAN family of systems (FoS) are an integrated commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) solution utilizing VSAT and networking components.  SWAN is an OTP 
communications asset and can be set up in 30 minutes or less.  SWAN fills a void of 
beyond LOS capability within the MAGTF communications infrastructure.  SWAN-D 
comes in three versions; small, medium and trailer mounted.  It consists of a RF Package 
and a network package.  Version 2 and 3 can be used with a Master Reference Terminal 
(the network hub).  The program of record is VSAT which will not include the Network 
Package.  However, since the Data Distribution System Modular (DDS-M) (also a 
Network Package) will not be fielded until 2010, SWAN-D is being fielded as the interim 
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Table 8.   SWAN Fact Sheet (After MARCORSYSCOM Programs & Equipment, 
2009) 
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9. Tropo/Satellite Support Radio (TSSR)  
The AN/GRC-239 Radio Set is a full duplex LOS microwave radio designed for 
quick deployable military applications.  Also known as the TSSR, this radio's ease of set-
up, transport, and reliable operations make it a great substitute for long cable runs.  The 
TSSR is used with almost all existing TRI-TAC equipment.  The TSSR is capable of 
providing connectivity to a single tri-service tactical (TRI-TAC) digital transmission 
group (DTG) with a data rate from 72-4608 KB/s.  The TSSR can also support a balanced 
non-return to zero (NRZ) group from the AN/TAC-1 at a 6.144 MB/s data rate.  An 
























CE  GCE  ACE  LCE 
MEF HQ, Comm Bn  
MARDIV,  HQ  Bn,  Comm 
Co   MWCS, MACG, MAW   MLG, H&S Bn  




This section highlights the systems and terminals that presently enable the Marine 
Corps to access the space-based domain.  At this time, the USMC beyond line of sight 
access is essentially limited to five systems.  The LMST, SMART-T, Phoenix, ECCS, 
and SWAN are the systems of record that provide inter-network, reach-down, and reach-
back capability.  Since many of the new advancements in technology are dependent on 
some sort of network or GIG connectivity it is critical that we focus on this area,  
particularly in the case of the Marine Corps since current systems are aging and reaching 
the end of their life cycle.  The military reliance on SATCOM in the near term does not 
appear to be decreasing.  In fact, a recent report from the Defense Science Board 
highlights spaced based capabilities as an area of serious importance that continues to 
exhibit increased vulnerabilities.  
The nation relies on space-based capabilities not only to meet the needs of 
joint military operations worldwide, but also to support diplomatic, 
informational, and economic efforts.  Space is essential to strategic and 
tactical military communications; missile warning; intelligence; and 
position, navigation, and timing.  Nevertheless, techniques to deny the use 
of space are proliferating. (Defense Science Board, 2009, p. 15) 
This fact helps to emphasize the significance of the role that SATCOM plays in the 
tactical and operational environment and reinforces the notion that it should not be 
ignored.  The Defense Science Board’s warning concerning the vulnerabilities of space-
based capabilities mirrors the warning contained in the NDS, which calls for 
diversification.  These assessments indicate that future SATCOM acquisitions should be 
part of a larger set of heterogeneous communication systems that ensure redundancy in 
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IV. FUTURE CAPABILITY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since it is often difficult to predict with any degree of certainty the time, location, 
duration, and intensity of a military operation, SATCOM systems must provide for all 
contingencies.   The military, intelligence, and other government agencies must rely on 
space-based systems to provide this connectivity for continuous operations globally 
without regard to the existing in-theater or regional telecommunications infrastructures 
(US Strategic Command, 2004, p. 2).  SATCOM has become a necessity for deployed 
forces and this reliance has been reinforced by emerging COTS technology that supports 
warfighter requirements. 
No discussion of requirements is complete without a clear understanding of the 
primary stakeholder.  It may be useful to establish the statutory basis upon which the 
Marine Corps exists.  It is important to understand the composition and functions of the 
USMC prior to making any assessments regarding SATCOM equipment capabilities.  
The composition and functions of the Marine Corps are codified in federal law. 
(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so 
organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air 
wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be 
organic therein.  The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and 
equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with 
supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or 
defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land 
operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.  In 
addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations 
for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security 
detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and 
bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct.  
However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the 
operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. 
(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and 
the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the 
tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces. 
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(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint 
mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the 
Marine Corps to meet the needs of war. (Title 10 U.S. Code Section 5063, 
2007, p. 1696) 
B. FUTURE CAPABILITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Prior to attempting to select an optimal system or family of systems that can meet 
the USMC operational mission requirements, it is essential to ensure that there is a basis 
for the terms used to describe the candidate system and its attributes.  Since the JCIDS 
manual sets the guidelines and procedures for analyzing and developing ICDs, CDDs, 
CPDs, and DCRs it is important to list out a few characterizations to ensure a consistent 
understanding of the terminology and to provide the framework for the rationale applied 
towards answering the question of what are the recommended beyond LOS wideband 
SATCOM capabilities given the guiding principles outlined in the NSS and DoD strategy 
and policy documents, and taking into account the DON and USMC doctrinal concepts. 
initial capabilities document (ICD) - Summarizes the CBA and 
recommends materiel or non-materiel approaches or approaches that are a 
combination of materiel and non-materiel to satisfy specific capability 
gaps. It defines the capability gap(s) in terms of the functional area, the 
relevant range of military operations, desired effects, time, and 
DOTMLPF and policy implications and constraints.  The ICD summarizes 
the results of the DOTMLPF analysis and the DOTMLPF approaches 
(materiel and non-materiel) that may deliver the required capability.  The 
outcome of an ICD could be one or more joint DOTMLPF change 
recommendations or capability development documents. (CJCS, 2009, p. 
GL-10) 
capability development document (CDD) - A document that captures the 
information necessary to develop a proposed program(s), normally using 
an evolutionary acquisition strategy.  The CDD outlines an affordable 
increment of militarily useful, logistically supportable, and technically 
mature capability.  The CDD may define multiple increments if there is 
sufficient definition of the performance attributes (key performance 
parameters, key system attributes, and other attributes) to allow approval 
of multiple increments. (CJCS, 2009, p.GL-6) 
capability production document (CPD) - A document that addresses the 
production elements specific to a single increment of an acquisition 
program.  The CPD defines an increment of militarily useful, logistically 
supportable, and technically mature capability that is ready for a 
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production decision.  The CPD defines a single increment of the 
performance attributes (key performance parameters, key system 
attributes, and other attributes). (CJCS, 2009, p GL-6) 
capability gaps - The inability to achieve a desired effect under specified 
standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to 
perform a set of tasks.  The gap may be the result of no existing capability, 
lack of proficiency or sufficiency in existing capability, or the need to 
replace an existing capability. (CJCS, 2009, p. GL-6) 
capability need - A capability identified through the CBA, required to be 
able to perform a task within specified conditions to a required level of 
performance. (CJCS, 2009, p. GL-6) 
key performance parameters (KPP) - Those attributes of a system that are 
considered critical or essential to the development of an effective military 
capability.  KPPs must be measurable and testable to enable feedback 
from test and evaluation efforts to the requirements process.  KPPs are 
validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for JROC 
Interest documents, by the Joint Capabilities Board for JCB Interest 
documents, and by the DOD component for Joint Integration, Joint 
Information, or Independent documents.  Capability development and 
capability production document KPPs are included verbatim in the 
acquisition program baseline. (CJCS, 2009, p. GL-15) 
key system attribute (KSA) - An attribute or characteristic considered 
crucial to achieving a balanced solution/approach to a system, but not 
critical enough to be designated a KPP.  KSAs provide decision makers 
with an additional level of capability performance characteristics below 
the KPP level and require a sponsor 4-star, Defense agency commander, 
or Principal Staff Assistant to change. (CJCS, 2009, p. GL-15) 
The terms defined above are common to the acquisitions domain and are very 
relevant to any consideration for future beyond LOS SATCOM capabilities, particularly 
since the solution to the SATCOM problem will not likely be solved by a non-material 
solution such as a change to DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities).  The common non-materiel 
approaches are alternate doctrinal approaches, alternate CONOPS, and policy 
alternatives.  Although modifications to doctrine and CONOPS may be part of the 
solution, beyond LOS in the future is likely to be addressed by a material solution that 
results in an SATCOM acquisition program to deliver the required capability.  However, 
the fielding of a candidate system could also require the consideration of non-material 
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alternatives to enable the system to work more effectively and provide more value to the 
warfighter.  Some non-materiel approaches are defined below along with characterization 
of the term materiel solution. 
Alternative Doctrinal Approaches and Alternative CONOPS - 
Investigating alternative CONOPS is a JCIDS requirement. The baseline 
assessment should only consider doctrinal CONOPS, but the non-materiel 
approach assessment should consider doctrinal alternatives, particularly 
those documented in an approved joint concept. (CJCS, 2009, p. A-7) 
Policy Alternatives - A policy change that allows new applications of 
existing capabilities or modifies force posture to increase deterrence is 
always of interest and should be considered. (CJCS, 2009, p. A-7) 
materiel solution  - Correction of a deficiency, satisfaction of a capability 
gap, or incorporation of new technology that results in the development, 
acquisition, procurement, or fielding of a new item (including ships, tanks, 
self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related software, spares, repair 
parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, 
and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military 
activities without disruption as to its application for administrative or 
combat purposes.  In the case of family of systems and system of systems 
approaches, an individual materiel solution may not fully satisfy a 
necessary capability gap on its own. (CJCS, 2009, p. GL-15) 
The Marine Corps must also consider several operational factors in determining 
future SATCOM system requirements.  The principal warfighting functions of maneuver, 
fires, intelligence, command and control, logistics, and force protection must not be 
ignored and should be factored into the decision process.  Additionally, quality attributes 
such as suitability, reliability, supportability, and sustainability should be used as metrics 
to indicate how the system(s) should perform. 
C. INTEROPERABILITY 
CJCSI 6212.01E Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology 
and National Security Systems provides key policies and procedures pertaining to 
interoperability needs within the JCIDS process.  It describes interoperability as follows. 
The ability of systems, units or forces to provide data, information, 
materiel and services to and accept the same from other systems, units or 
forces and to use the data, information, materiel and services so exchanged 
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to enable them to operate effectively together.  IT and NSS 
interoperability includes both the technical exchange of information and 
the operational effectiveness of that exchanged information as required for 
mission accomplishment.  Interoperability is more than just information 
exchange.  It includes systems, processes, procedures, organizations, and 
missions over the lifecycle and must be balanced with IA. (CJCS, 2008, p. 
GL-15) 
The instruction states that all programs of records require interoperability and 
supportability certification.  It calls for program managers and military services to ensure 
that their systems and subsystems meet the following requirements. 
Interoperable with other DOD, Joint and Coalition systems, implement the 
DOD Net--Centric Data Strategy and Net-Centric Services Strategy 
policies, including participating in applicable Communities of Interest, 
within security constraints. 
Properly evaluated and certified for interoperability by the DISA (JITC). 
(CJCS, 2008, p. C-12) 
It should be pointed out that there are some special considerations laid out for 
SATCOM terminals and radios.  In some cases, SATCOM interoperability requirements 
may need to be confirmed with J-6 (CJCS, 2008, p. D-9).  The need for interoperability 
within the domain of SATCOM is reiterated in CJCS Instruction 6250.01 Satellite 
Communications. 
D. BEST PRACTICES 
This section will briefly describe some best practices that can be applied towards 
future acquisition and management of systems.  In some cases, these practices are in fact 
required by policy or directive.  Regardless, it should be common sense for leaders and 
managers at all levels to seek out ways to promote efficiency and maximize value.  The 
goal of this section is to put forth several concepts that might help provide a new or 
improved capability to the warfighter faster.  It is not the aim of this section to provide a 
comprehensive review all best practices or even of those described herein; delving deeper 
is left up to the initiative of the individual reader.  Rather, this section is intended to 
stimulate interest and discussion in continually improving the acquisitions process for the 
benefit of the warfighter on the front lines. 
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1. Practices Required by the National Space Policy 
In regards to space system development and procurement, the NSP states that all 
departments and agencies shall:   
• Improve timely acquisition and deployment of space systems through 
enhancements in estimating costs, technological risk and maturity, and 
industrial base capabilities; 
• Reduce programmatic risk through improved management of 
requirements and by taking advantage of cost-effective opportunities to 
test high-risk components, payloads, and technologies in space or relevant 
environments; 
• Embrace innovation to cultivate and sustain an entrepreneurial U.S. 
research and development environment; and 
• Engage with industrial partners to improve processes and effectively 
manage the supply chains. (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 6) 
The NSP also directs all departments and agencies to strengthen interagency 
partnerships.  Such partnerships, among other things, can help prevent unnecessary 
duplication of efforts and potentially reduce costs. 
Departments and agencies shall improve their partnerships through 
cooperation, collaboration, information sharing, and/or alignment of 
common pursuits.  Departments and agencies shall make their capabilities 
and expertise available to each other to strengthen our ability to achieve 
national goals, identify desired outcomes, leverage U.S. capabilities, and 
develop implementation and response strategies. (Office of the President, 
The, 2010, p. 6) 
2. Capability Portfolio Management 
DoD Directive 7045.20 Capability Portfolio Management states that it is DoD 
policy that the Department of Defense shall use capability portfolio management.  
Capability portfolio management is described as "The process of integrating, 
synchronizing, and coordinating Department of Defense capabilities needs with current 
and planned DOTMLPF investments within a capability portfolio to better inform 
decision making and optimize defense resources" (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
2008, p. 8).  The service components are required to "Ensure that their respective 
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decision forums, processes, policies, and procedures support capability portfolio 
management" (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 5). 
[Capability is defined as] the ability to achieve a desired effect under 
specified standards and conditions through a combination of means and 
ways across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 
education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to perform a set of tasks 
to execute a specified course of action. (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2008, p. 8) 
A capability portfolio is a collection of grouped capabilities.  The purpose of 
capability portfolio management is to optimize capability investments across the defense 
enterprise (both materiel and non-materiel) and minimize risk in meeting the 
Department’s capability needs in support of strategy.  The process is accomplished by 
leveraging operational experts to identify issues, priorities, and capability and resource 
mismatches (gaps, shortfalls, and redundancies) (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
2008, pp. 1 and 2).  The duties of a portfolio manager are described as follows. 
Provide recommendations or advice to appropriate DoD decision makers 
and forums regarding integration, coordination, and synchronization of 
capability requirements to capability investments.  Evaluate capability 
demand (both warfighting and non-warfighting) against resource 
constraints, identify and assess risks, and suggest capability trade-offs 
within their capability portfolio to the Heads of the DoD Components, and 
to the DAWG through the following activities. (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2008, p. 6) 
In order to be able to do this, portfolio managers must be given access to and 
visibility of pertinent information and internal processes (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2008, p. 5).  This requires the full support of the leadership structure.  
Capability portfolio management can lead to cost savings and increasingly interoperable 
capabilities to support the forces. 
3. Continuous Process Improvement 
DoD Directive 5010.42 DoD-Wide Continuous Process Improvement (CPI)/Lean 
Six Sigma (LSS) Program states that it is DoD policy that Continuous Process 
Improvement (CPI)/Lean Six Sigma (LSS) shall be implemented across all of the military 
services.  The objective of the DoD CPI/LSS program is to strengthen joint operational 
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Combatant Command and Military Department capabilities including making 
improvements in productivity, performance (availability, reliability, cycle time, 
investment, and operating costs), safety, flexibility, and energy efficiency.  The directive 
says that "Each DoD Component should use CPI/LSS concepts and tools to improve the 
full range of processes and activities that comprise their operations, including decision-
making processes and appropriate engagement with industrial base suppliers" (Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 2).  The services are directed to "implement CPI/LSS 
programs to improve overall effectiveness and efficiency across missions and functions 
to gain the broadest possible range of organizational improvements" (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 2).  CPI/LSS concepts and tools should be applied to the 
full range of DoD organizations, to include combat, industrial, service, and office 
environments of headquarters, field, and operational organizations.  As a result, this 
applies towards organizations that deal with acquisitions or managing programs. 
Details on how to implement CPI/LSS are contained in the Continuous Process 
Improvement Transformation Guidebook.  CPI comprises the application of tools and 
methods such as Lean Six Sigma and Theory of Constraints, with a value stream focus 
within the enterprise being transformed.  In his prefatory memorandum institutionalizing 
CPI, Deputy Secretary of Defense England states that "The Secretary and I expect that 
every DoD organization is focused every day on improving the effectiveness of our 
support to the Warfighter" (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. i).  He goes on to 
specifically point out that CPI has improved the operating effectiveness of DoD logistics 
and acquisition activities.  Some of the key tenets of CPI are keeping the customer in 
mind, being cost conscious, and staying receptive to new CPI concepts and tools as they 
evolve.  Continuous improvement boils down to good leadership and management.  
Education, documentation, metrics, and periodic reviews are some of the necessary 
management practices to keep in mind as leaders implement CPI/LSS. 
4. Product Lines 
A product line can be a good approach to develop systems that will share many 
common features.  It follows that systems with common features are likely to be more 
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interoperable, or at least more easily modified to be interoperable.  Interoperability is a 
desired attribute in an increasingly joint and coalition environment.  The Software 
Engineering Institute states that product lines can potentially improve productivity, 
quality, developmental time, and costs (http://www.sei.cmu.edu/productlines/).  Product 
lines may also facilitate implementation of standards, which can lead to products of 
incrementally increasing capabilities and quality.  This in turn helps to maximize value 
for the customer. 
E. SUMMARY 
Electrical engineer and computer scientist Daniel Hillis (2010) has made the 
following sobering assessment:  "Our technology has gotten so complex that we no 
longer can understand it or fully control it.”  The NSS states that, "Technology will 
continue to bring with it new dangers" (Office of the President, The, 2010, p. 13).  In an 
increasingly complex and dangerous security environment, it becomes even more 
challenging to ascertain the way forward especially for high-stakes, high-cost systems 
such as WB SATCOM.  There are many factors that must be considered as the Marine 
Corps develops future SATCOM-related concepts and plans for new systems.  The 
Marine Corps must take into account DoD and CJCS guiding principles and desired 
attributes, and also consider the context provided by the NSS.  It must remain true to its 
doctrinal roots as the nation’s expeditionary force in readiness.  Yet, per the Marine 
Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, “it cannot assume there will be technological silver 
bullets or doctrinal formulas that ensure military success” (USMC, 2008, p. 13). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSION 
The NSS suggests that there is still a future for SATCOM in the Marine Corps.  
SATCOM may become part of a larger set of communications assets that provide 
redundant capabilities, as called for in the NDS.  However, SATCOM capabilities fill a 
unique niche for expeditionary forces that no other type of asset can fully duplicate.  The 
USMC should continue to further develop and refine its SATCOM assets, while also 
looking into other options that can mitigate risks and threats described in the NDS.  It 
should remain committed to its expeditionary character, as that is the trend for Armed 
Forces as described in the NMS.  The Marine Corps operating concepts call for lighter, 
faster, more efficient end items.  The documents analyzed for this thesis also highlighted 
the ever-increasing need for interoperability across the board, to include joint and 
coalition forces.  Although a relatively low-density asset, interoperability should still be a 
consideration for SATCOM systems.  Interoperability is a long-term goal that can be 
attained faster if it is considered early in the acquisition process for each new system.  By 
applying concepts such as capability portfolio management and CPI, as described in the 
best practices section, SATCOM systems promise to provide ever increasing capabilities 
to the warfighter. 
Upon commencement of this research we sought to explore national policy, 
doctrinal publications, and guiding instructions in an attempt to better understand the 
relationship and impact that these policy documents have on the development of beyond 
LOS SATCOM.  Four fundamental questions were presented: 
1. What does the current NSS suggest for the future of USMC SATCOM? 
2. Given DoD and DON strategy and policy documents, and taking into 
account the NSS and USMC doctrinal principles, what are the recommended beyond 
LOS wideband SATCOM capabilities? 
3. What are the interoperability requirements? 
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4. What industry and DoD acquisition best practices should be applied to get 
the recommended capabilities to the warfighter quickly and cost effectively? 
This thesis addresses these questions within the content of the chapters, and the 
analysis of the relevant publications reveal that there is definitely a measure of 
interconnectedness between policy and the development of future wideband LOS 
SATCOM systems.  This study used the MAGTF as a vignette to illustrate the dynamic 
and unpredictable user requirements that must be satisfied by future SATCOM systems.  
The need for SATCOM on the battlefield is not diminishing; consequently, components 
of the JCIDS framework were described because any new wideband beyond LOS 
SATCOM system procured in the future would be required to meet the key performance 
parameters and conform to oversight requirements set by the JCIDS manual.  One of the 
underlying goals of this research was to provide an analytical foundation to help shape 
future USMC SATCOM operational concepts and to provide relevant information to aid 
in planning for future SATCOM systems acquisitions.  At a minimum, we hope to at least 
help to shape USMC requirements that must be satisfied by new beyond LOS systems. 
B. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The NMS states that initiatives under development by the DoD related to 
information sharing and battlespace awareness include the Global Information Grid 
(GIG), Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Concept, the Multinational Information 
Sharing (MNIS) Transformation Change Package (TCP) (CJCS, 2004, p. 25).  These and 
other similar initiatives may merit further research as to their impact on SATCOM. 
The NDS directs the military to develop alternative means to accomplish the 
mission (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008, p. 22).  This should apply to 
communication systems as well.  Finding the right balance of alternative communication 
systems, e.g., space-based satellites, aerostats, or unmanned aerial vehicle networks, is an 
area that may merit future research. 
The concepts presented in this thesis could be further elucidated through 
development of an operational scenario.  In addition, such an operational scenario could 
form the basis for traffic analysis experiments that could help to further refine USMC 
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SATCOM requirements and optimize equipment utilization.  Traffic could be analyzed to 
determine what percent is beyond LOS intra-MAGTF and what percent pulls DISN 
services.  Additionally, further analysis might yield traffic load by warfighting function 
(e.g. C2, Fires, Intelligence, Logistics). 
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